Zombie Pirate Ninja Monkey

Cricket, Wellington and Waterloo

My uncle forwarded me a question from a friend today at work: "at 18:30 on 18 June 1815 - if offered, would Wellington have 'taken the light'?"

This probably qualifies as counterfactual history, in as much as the umpires at Waterloo did not, to the best of our knowledge, offer Wellington the light.  And counterfactual history is, as always, a delight.  The question is even better because of the way it is couched.  Cricket has the image of being the least warlike of sports (in the absence of "legitimate leg side theory").  More than that, there is a curious, poetic beauty about the idea of being "offered the light" (a phrase which, for me, ranks alongside being "invited to follow-on": a genteel way of describing being forced to face the depths of one's humiliating situation).

My only argument with the terms of the question would be that the answer is a little obvious for the time given.  By half past six, the Prussians had arrived on the battlefield and drawn off the young guard; Ney had exhausted much of the French cavalry in pointless mass charges unsupported by the other arms; and Napoleon had squandered much of his reserve in bloody failure against Hougomont.  More than that, it was at five or so that the Old Guard was repulsed in their charge.

More difficult to judge, perhaps, would be an offer of the light at 16:00 or so.  At that point, Ney's charges have occurred.  Hougomont has done its work to the French reserves, but at terrible cost to the defenders.  It may yet fall, and expose the British flank.  On top of this, la Haye Sainte on the other flank is falling to the French; both Young and Old Guards are intact and uncommitted; the Heavy Brigade is mauled; the Dutch-Belgian Brigade has withdrawn; Picton, the reserve on that flank, is badly mauled; and several regiments on the forward slope of the Anglo-Allied position have effectively ceased to exist as fighting units.

The situation looks much more grim at this point.  More than that, the bulk of Wellington's army (except the flanks) was unengaged at that point, and could be withdrawn in fair order, towards a source of hardened veterans of the peninsular war - effectively an opportunity to take the light.  The commander is the older Wellington of Toulouse, not that of Assaye (when he forded a river on a flank march, then frontally attacked his enemy when they changed their disposition).  At Fuentes de Onoro he had shown his willingness to accept an inconclusive result in order to fight another day, and Salamanca was a battle that almost didn't happen, after Wellington had earlier decided to withdraw on strategic grounds.  Wellington's army had to remain in being: a severe defeat might yet have driven the Prussians back to the Rhineland (as Gneisenau had planned) and might indeed have inflicted serious damage upon the coalition.

But, as at Salamanca, Wellington saw a tactical opportunity that outweighed the advantages of relying purely on his strategic resources.  His opinion of Napoleon had fallen after the disasterous cavalry attacks ("the man's nothing but a pounder"): he didn't know that those were the work of Ney.  He also must have known that the delay in the start of the French artillery attack until 11:35 was more than he could hope to gain again, and would have suspected, surely, that the resulting state of the ground had precluded horse-artillery adequately supporting Ney in his Quixotic efforts (although Ney himself needed no help from the weather).  And Grouchy's detached corps might appear if Napoleon was given time to regroup.

Most of all, Wellington seems to have sincerely believed that Blucher would rally and re-appear.  This was, on the face of it, hugely unlikely: the Prussians had been soundly defeated and should be retreating in poor order.  But Wellington had faith that they would appear, and gambled his army upon them doing so.  What is more, had he retired prematurely, leaving the field with the possibility that the Prussians would appear as promised and face the entire French army, he would have been harshly treated.  After Ney's charges, by about 4.30PM. he is reported as saying 'The battle is mine; and if the Prussians arrive soon, there will be an end of the war.' (reported by Captain Gronow).

Perhaps he also shared Napoleon's view that the result of a retreat would inevitably be that each of the Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies would be forced to fall back upon their lines of supply: the former to the east, the latter to the north.  This had been Napoleon's habitual method throughout over 15 years: concentrate your forces at the vital point, and separate those of your enemy before dealing with each from a central position.

So no.  I think Wellington had his battlefield, was happy with it and was, by late afternoon, confident that he would at least hold the field until nightfall.  But he may, indeed, have been playing for the draw at that point.